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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court, which has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-
3-102, transferred this appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78A-4-103. Therefore, jurisdiction is proper in the Utah Court of Appeals. 
APPLICABLE STATUTES AND RULES 
The following rules are of central importance to the appeal: Utah Rule of Evidence 
404; Utah Rule of Evidence 608; and Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24. Their text is 
included verbatim in the Addendum attached hereto. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On or about August 31,2007, Appellees Goodman & Chesnoff and David Chesnoff 
(hereinafter "Chesnoff) obtained a judgment for unpaid attorney fees against Michael 
Nikols (hereinafter "Michael") in the Third District Court for Salt Lake County. Early in the 
case, Chesnoff obtained a prejudgment writ of attachment against four parcels of real 
property located in Murray, Utah, which parcels were titled in Michael's name (the 
"Properties"). John Nikols (hereinafter "John"), Michael's father, brought a third-party 
action against Chesnoff demanding, among other things, the discharge of Chesnoff s writ of 
attachment. John contended that he was the owner of the Properties under the theory of a 
purchase money resulting trust. 
The lower court held that Chesnoff could not execute his judgment against the 
attached Properties until John had the opportunity to present his resulting trust claim in a 
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post-judgment evidentiary hearing. At that hearing, on April 1,2008, the lower court found 
that John failed to meet his clear and convincing burden of establishing a purchase money 
resulting trust. John appealed the lower court's ruling from that post-judgment hearing. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In 1988, John purchased three of the four Properties but caused them to be titled in 
Michael's name. R. 2953: 58-59. John stipulated at the evidentiary hearing that the 
Properties were titled in Michael's name for the express purpose of avoiding John's then-
existing creditors who had liens and judgments against him totaling over $300,000.00. R. 
2953: 41 (3-12); 63-69. John also stipulated that the "lion's share" of his outstanding tax 
liens and judgments were not paid until sometime in 1991. R. 2953:60-62. This stipulation 
contradicted John's statements to the court in an earlier hearing that he had paid all of his 
creditors at the time of the 1988 conveyance to Michael. R. 2953: 71. In 1994, John 
purchased the fourth parcel of the four Properties which, once again, was titled in Michael's 
name. R. 2953: 59-60. 
At the evidentiary hearing, John and Michael proffered testimony that John was the 
true owner of the Properties because he paid the purchase price for them. R. 2953: 35-36. 
Scott Mercer, counsel for Chesnoff, cross-examined John with respect to his resulting trust 
claim. R. 2953:41. However, when Mr. Mercer sought to cross-examine Michael, Michael 
asserted, prior to taking the witness stand, that he would exercise his Fifth Amendment right 
to remain silent. R. 2953: 119-120. Furthermore, when Mr. Mercer sought to put Chesnoff 
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on the stand to rebut John's claims, John and Michael announced that Michael would not 
waive the attorney-client privilege, since Chesnoff s testimony might be prejudicial to 
Michael's pending criminal charges. R. 2953: 156 (24-25); 157 (1-6). 
The lower court held that "John Nikols failed to meet his burden of establishing that 
a resulting trust existed with respect to the Murray properties." R. 2930. The lower court 
based its finding on the following: (1) John's failure to present adequate evidence to support 
his resulting trust claim (R. 2930); (2) a misrepresentation John had made to the Court in an 
earlier proceeding (R. 2930); and (3) the impact Michael's refusal to testify and Chesnoff s 
inability to testify had on Chesnoff s ability to present his case and to determine the 
credibility of John and Michael (R. 2930). John appealed this decision. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
John failed to marshal the evidence. John failed to prove the existence of a purchase 
money resulting trust by clear and convincing evidence. John stipulated that the express 
purpose of putting title to the Properties in Michael's name was to avoid John's then-existing 
creditors. John further stipulated that this constituted an improper purpose. Utah law does 
not allow one with unclean hands to seek aid from a court in equity. Thus, John's scheme 
to avoid his creditors precluded him from establishing the equitable remedy of a resulting 
trust. 
Even assuming arguendo that John did have clean hands, he still did not satisfy the 
clear and convincing burden necessary to establish a resulting trust. When John purchased 
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the Properties but had them titled in Michael's name, it created a presumption under Utah 
law that John intended to gift the Properties to his son. Utah law does not allow John to 
overcome this presumption merely by showing that he paid the purchase price, taxes, and 
maintenance on the Properties. Furthermore, John failed to provide testimony from Michael 
- the only other party to the alleged resulting trust - that the purchase was anything other 
than a gift to Michael. The lower court properly discounted John's testimony on the basis 
that John had earlier misrepresented key facts to the Court. 
The lower court correctly drew an adverse inference against John when John did not 
call Michael as a witness at the evidentiary hearing. Chesnoff s right to cross-examine 
Michael was absolute and Chesnoff s case would have been materially prejudiced had the 
lower court allowed Michael to testify and then avoid meaningful cross-examination by 
asserting the Fifth Amendment. Michael, as John's son, was a witness that was peculiarly 
in John's control to produce. The fact that John did not produce Michael as a witness created 
an inference that Michael's testimony would have been adverse to John's resulting trust 
claim. 
The lower court also correctly drew an adverse inference against John when John 
objected to Chesnoff s being called as a witness. Michael and John refused to waive 
Michael's attorney-client privilege, effectively preventing Chesnoff from testifying. John 
denied Chesnoff the right to put on his evidence and rebut John's resulting trust claim. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. JOHN COMPLETELY FAILED TO MARSHAL THE FACTUAL EVIDENCE 
AS REQUIRED BY UTAH RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 24(a)(9), 
John failed to marshal all of the relevant evidence introduced at trial with respect to 
his resulting trust claim. For this reason alone, the lower court's ruling should be upheld. 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(9) states in relevant part: "A party 
challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged 
finding." This Court has described the marshaling process as "arduous and painstaking." 
West Valley City v. Majestic Investment Company 818 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Ut. App. 1991). 
It involves detailing all of the facts and evidence presented at trial that tends to support the 
lower court's findings and then showing why those findings are clearly erroneous. Id- at 
1313. 
The court in Majestic further stated "[t]he marshaling process is not unlike becoming 
the devil's advocate. Counsel must extricate himself or herself from the client's shoes and 
fully assume the adversary's position...[T]he challenger must present...every scrap of 
competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings appellant resists." 
Id. at 1315. Merely rearguing all of the evidence supporting one's position does not 
constitute proper marshaling. C.E. Butters Realty and Const., Inc. v. McFarland, 2004 WL 
1368145 at *1 (Utah App. 2004) (unreported). 
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Mentioning relevant facts throughout an appellant's brief does not satisfy the 
marshaling requirement. To comply with the marshaling requirement, "appellants must 
marshal all the favorable evidence at the point which they challenge the factual finding." 
Roderick v. Ricks, 2002 UT 84, fn. 11,54 P.3d 1119; see also Tanner v. Carter, 2001 UT 18 
ffif 18-19, 20 P.3d 332 (concluding appellant's listing of favorable facts in fact section did 
not meet marshaling requirement). A failure to do so creates an assumption "that all the trial 
court's findings are supported by the evidence." Utah Med. Prods, v. Searcy, 958 P.2d 228, 
233 (Utah 1998). For this reason, Utah courts have "shown no reluctance to affirm when the 
appellant fails to adequately marshal the evidence." Majestic, 818 P.2d at 1313. (citations 
omitted). 
In his appellate brief, John failed to properly marshal, or even mention, at least nine 
key points of evidence which supported the lower court's finding that John had failed to 
establish the existence of a purchase money resulting trust at trial: 
1. At trial, the parties stipulated on the record that the titling of the properties to 
Michael in 1988 was for an improper purpose - to avoid John's creditors. Judge Kennedy 
and John's counsel, Rebecca Hyde, had the following exchange: 
THE COURT: Well, I asked him for a stipulation. Are you willing to 
stipulate to that or not? 
MS HYDE: To avoid the creditors, if the Court characterizes that as an 
improper purpose, yes, he did. 
THE COURT: Okay. And this was to avoid John's creditors. 
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MS HYDE: John's creditors, that's correct. 
THE COURT: All right. Well, we'll accept that as a further stipulation then 
to what we've already received. 
R. 2953: 41. 
2. Michael was made president of John's restaurant, Coachman's, about the same 
time Michael took title to the Properties. R. 2953: 49. This evidence reasonably infers that 
John was beginning to give the responsibility for his assets to his children at this time. 
3. On cross examination, John further admitted he had outstanding tax liens and 
judgments against him at the time the Properties were titled in Michael's name. R. 2953:57-
58. This demonstrates the true reason for putting title to the Properties in Michael's name. 
4. In 1994, John purchased the last of the four Properties. R. 2953: 59. The 
parties stipulated at trial that most of the tax liens and other judgments against John had been 
satisfied three years earlier, in 1991. R. 2953: 71. That John titled the fourth Property in 
Michael's name even after the majority of creditors had been paid is further evidence of his 
intent to gift the Properties to Michael. 
5. John admitted at trial that he had not paid his creditors at the time the 1988 
conveyance occurred. R. 2953: 64. However, John had told the Court in an earlier 
proceeding that those creditors had been paid prior to 1988. R. 2953: 60 (21-25); 61-62. 
6. Michael transferred the Properties back to John only after Chesnoff s pre-
judgment writ of attachment, some 18 years after the original conveyance to Michael. 
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According to John's testimony, the various tax liens and judgments had all been paid about 
fifteen years earlier. R. 2953:76. 
7. John admitted that he paid all of the attorney fees for Michael's other lawyers. 
John told Chesnoff that John would help his son "to the maximum." R. 2953: 114. This 
evidences John's custom of gifting things to Michael. 
8. John stated that the source of income he used to pay the mortgages on the 
Properties was from Coachman's Restaurant. R. 2953: 115-116. However, Michael had 
taken over the management of Coachman's from John at the time. R. 2953: 49. The lower 
court could have concluded Michael was indirectly paying for the Properties through his 
management of Coachman's. 
9. On October 18, 2005, Michael pled guilty in federal court to a count of 
conspiracy to distribute narcotics. 
John also failed to marshal several of the lower court's relevant findings as detailed 
in its order: 
1. The April 1,2008, evidentiary hearing was the time and place for John 
Nikols to present evidence supporting his opposition to the Writ of 
Attachment and, specifically, to present evidence supporting his claim 
that a resulting trust in his favor existed. R. 2930. 
2. At the February 2008 hearing in this matter, John Nikols stated to the 
Court that he had paid all of the judgments and liens against him as of 
April 13, 1988, when the first of the Murray Properties was purchased 
in the name of Michael Nikols. R. 2930. 
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3. The Stipulation of Facts presented to the Court on April 1, 2008, 
together with the testimony of John Nikols established that John 
Nikols' previous claim of having paid his liens and judgments was not 
accurate. R. 2930. 
4. Michael Nikols refused to waive his Fifth Amendment right to remain 
silent if he were called to be cross-examined in this proceeding. Thus, 
Chesnoff would not be able fully to cross-examine Michael Nikols with 
regard to the claim of the existence of a resulting trust. R. 2930. 
5. The credibility of John Nikols and Michael Nikols regarding the 
existence of a resulting trust is a fundamental issue in this proceeding. 
Chesnoff s inability to cross-examine Michael Nikols to assist in 
determining Michael Nikols' credibility as well as that of his father 
John Nikols was prejudicial to Chesnoff. R. 2930. 
John either completely omits the foregoing evidence or scatters references to it 
throughout his brief. In either case, John clearly fails to marshal "all the favorable evidence 
at the point which [he] challenge^] the factual finding." Roderick 54 P.3d at 1129. John has 
not assumed the position of devil's advocate, and he has not stated every "scrap" of evidence 
that supports the lower court's findings. Majestic, 818 P.2d at 1313. Because John has 
failed to adequately marshal the evidence, this Court should "show[] no reluctance to affirm" 
the lower court's finding that John failed to establish a resulting trust. Id. 
II. JOHN NIKOLS FAILED TO PROVE THE EXISTENCE OF A PURCHASE 
MONEY RESULTING TRUST. 
A. John Nikols' unclean hands preclude him from obtaining equitable relief. 
A purchase money resulting trust is an equitable remedy "designed to implement what 
the law assumes to be the intentions of the putative trustor." Matter of Hock's Estate, 655 
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P.2d 1111, 1114 (Utah 1982). It is axiomatic that a party seeking equity must come to the 
court with clean hands. Park v. Jameson, 364 P.2d 1,3 (Utah 1961). This means that"a party 
who seeks an equitable remedy must have acted in good faith and not in violation of 
equitable principles." Hone v. Hone, 2004 UT App 241, ^ 7, 95 P.3d 1221; see also 
Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 557 P.2d 156, 158 (Utah 1976) (party who engaged in fraud or deceit 
in business under consideration will be denied equitable relief when fairness and good 
conscience so demand). 
Section § 444 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts states that a resulting trust cannot 
be established for an illegal purpose: 
Where a transfer of property is made to one person and another pays the 
purchase price in order to accomplish an illegal purpose, a resulting 
trust does not arise if the policy against unjust enrichment of the 
transferee is outweighed by the policy against giving relief to a person 
who has entered into an illegal transaction. 
The phrase "illegal purpose" is not limited to instances where a party has broken the law. 
Rather, § 444 most commonly applies in situations where "the purchaser of property takes 
title in the name of another for the purpose of defrauding his creditors." Id. at § 444, cmt. 
a; see also In re Valente. 360 F.3d 256,264 (1st Cir. 2004) (upholding this interpretation of 
§ 444). Indeed, "[t]he law will not permit a party to deliberately place his property out of his 
control for a fraudulent purpose and then, through the intervention of a court of equity, assist 
him in regaining the property after the fraudulent purpose has been accomplished. Rather, 
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it will leave the parties as it finds them." Peric v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 411 N.E.2d 
934, 935 (111. App. 1980). 
Utah courts have consistently refused to establish resulting trusts where the party 
seeking the remedy has engaged in acts against public policy. For example, in Olsenv. Bank 
ofEphraim, a husband purchased land and sheep, but took title in his wife's name in order 
to evade certain United States Forest Service regulations. 68 P.2d 195 (Utah 1937). The 
Utah Supreme Court held that the husband could not assert an equitable interest in the land, 
on the basis that a resulting trust will not arise out of acts against public policy. Id. at 198. 
The Court further stated that "[a] court of equity will not lend its aid to relieve a party from 
the consequences of his fraud, but will leave him where his fraudulent undertaking has 
placed him." Id. 
In Hone v. Hone, a home was owned by a Trust. 2004 UT App 241, f2. Alta Hone 
lived in the home and was the beneficiary of the Trust and her two sons, Alton and Lloyd, 
were the trustees. Id. at ^ [3-4. All desired for Alta to receive Medicaid benefits but did not 
want a Medicaid lien to attach to the home. Id. at 1222. Under Medicaid rules, if all 
property rights in the homestead were transferred to Lloyd, who had lived in the home for 
the requisite period under Medicaid laws, then a lien could be avoided. Id. However, Alton 
and Lloyd further agreed that when their mother passed away, the property would be 
transferred back to the Trust. Id. The practical effect of this agreement was that Lloyd 
continued to hold the property in trust for the Trust, and thus the transfer did not comply with 
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the Medicaid rule that all interest in the property be transferred to Lloyd. Id. at [^8. Later, 
when Lloyd refused to transfer the home back into the Trust, Alton sued. The Utah Court 
of Appeals held that "Alton Hone did not act in good faith when he participated in the 
original transfer of the Homestead to avoid a Medicaid lien," and thus was not entitled to the 
equitable remedy of having the Court reform the deed. Id. at \l. 
In the instant case, it is undisputed that title to the Properties was taken in Michael's 
name in order to avoid John's creditors. John stipulated to that fact at trial. R. 2953: 41. 
John further stipulated that John had outstanding creditors and judgments against him in 1988 
when the first three Properties were put in Michael's name. R. 2953: 64. These judgments 
and liens amounted to well over $300,000.00. R. 2953: 41 (3-12); 63-69. As such, John 
comes to the Court with unclean hands. For several years, John avoided his creditors by 
shifting assets to his son, Michael. Now that, some 20 years later, Michael has a judgment 
against him, John seeks the imposition of an equitable trust to protect the Properties from 
Michael's creditor. Because John comes before this Court with unclean hands, the Court 
should "leave the parties as it finds them," and allow Chesnoff to proceed with his writ of 
attachment. Peric, 411 N.E.2d at 935; Olsen. 68 P.2d at 198. 
B. Assuming, arguendo, that John Nikols has clean hands, he did not 
establish a purchase money resulting trust by clear and convincing 
evidence. 
When a court is "called upon to alter a deed or other writing which is regular in form 
and is presumed to convey a clear and unambiguous title...the party alleging the variance 
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must prove the claim by clear and convincing evidence." Matter of Hock's Estate, 655 P.2d 
1111,1114 (Utahl982) (citing Jacobson. 557 P.2d 156 and Pagano v. Walker. 539 P.2d 452 
(Utah 1975); see also Mattes v. Olearain. 759 P.2d 1177,1179 (Utah App. 1988) and Baker 
v. Pattee. 684 P.2d 632,634 (Utah 1984) (party attacking validity of written instrument must 
do so by clear and convincing evidence)). That is an onerous burden, greater than the 
preponderance of the evidence standard typically found in civil cases. Tanner, 2001 UT 18 
at 1[3 3. Clear and convincing evidence "clinches what might be otherwise only probable to 
the mind." Sine v. Harper. 222 P.2d 571, 581 (Utah 1950). It must be convincing to the 
point that "there remains no serious or substantial doubt as to the correctness of the 
conclusion." Id. 
Generally, conveyances from parent to child give rise to an inference that a gift was 
intended: 
[A] conveyance on a consideration from a husband, parent, or other 
person, where title is taken in the name of the wife, child or other 
natural object of the purchaser's bounty, generally does not raise, but 
on the contrary rebuts, a resulting trust, and raises a presumption of a 
gratuitous settlement on the grantee. 
In re Clemens. 472 F.2d 939, 943 (6th Cir. 1972) (citation omitted); see also Matter of 
Hock's Estate. 655 P.2d at 1114; and §§ 442 and 443 of Restatement (Second) of Trusts. 
Thus, in familial transactions, the advocate of the trust must establish "by clear, strong, 
unequivocal evidence which convinces the trier of fact beyond doubt that such trust was 
13 
created." Hocking v. Hocking. 394 N.E.2d 653, 658 (111. App. 1979). If the transaction is 
"susceptive of any other reasonable interpretation, then no trust will be found." Id. 
Because John is Michael's father, the Properties are assumed to be a gift. It is John's 
burden to rebut this presumption with clear and convincing evidence. In re Clemens. 472 
F.2d at 943. John did not meet his burden. It was impossible to do so without the son's 
testimony. Michael might have testified that the Properties belonged to him. Furthermore, 
while John claims title was placed in Michael's name in order to avoid creditors, he cannot 
explain why the Properties remained in Michael's name until 2006,18 years after the initial 
purchases, and many years after John's judgment creditors had been paid. In fact, while 
John's various liens and judgments had been paid years earlier, Michael only conveyed the 
Properties to John after Michael's creditors attached the Properties. Moreover, while John 
may have paid the mortgages on the Properties, this does not preclude the possibility that he 
did so for Michael's benefit, especially where Michael was employed by John at the time. 
It was John's burden to show a "manifest intention" to create a resulting trust with 
Michael. However, John's testimony, standing alone, without any testimony from the other 
prong of the alleged resulting trust, did not meet the clear and convincing burden of proof. 
Furthermore, the lower court was skeptical of John's credibility, noting that John had stated 
facts directly to the Court in an earlier proceeding that were "not accurate." R. 2930. Thus, 
the lower court had reason to discount John's self-serving testimony, which is the only 
evidence John offered attrial. While Michael's testimony could have bolstered John's claim, 
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it also could have established Michael's belief that the Properties were a gift and no resulting 
trust was ever intended. 
The law unquestionably presumes that a transaction involving a father who pays the 
purchase price for real property and puts the title in his son's name is intended as a gift. John 
ultimately failed to provide clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. It should also be 
noted that the lower court was in the best position to "view the witnesses and assess their 
credibility" and, as such, its findings should be given great deference. Hocking, 394 N.E.2d 
at 658. For these reasons, there can be no resulting trust and the lower court's ruling should 
be affirmed. 
John cites several cases which he claims support his position that the lower court 
should have found a resulting trust in his favor. His reliance on those cases is misplaced. 
For example, the ruling in Woodard v. Funderburk actually favors Chesnoff s position. 846 
So.2d 363 (Ala. App. 2002). In Woodard, a man named Larry purchased property but caused 
it to be titled in the name of his son, Jason, to avoid a judgment against him and in favor of 
the Mississippi Tax Commission. Later, one of Jason's creditors, Sabrina, attempted to 
attach the property. The court held that "a fraudulent conveyance is valid as to all the world 
except creditors of the grantor." Id. (citation omitted). Thus, with respect to the conveyance 
to Jason, the court concluded, "[a]s to Sabrina (and anyone other than the Mississippi State 
Tax Commission), the 1994 conveyance was valid" and was therefore attachable. Id. In 
other words, only the Tax Commission, as Larry's creditor, would have standing to contest 
the conveyance to Jason. 
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Similarly, in the instant case John had judgments against him when he purchased the 
Properties. John caused the Properties to be titled in Michael's name in order to avoid his 
creditors. According to Woodard, only John's creditors that existed at the time the Properties 
were titled in Michael's name have standing to contest the transactions. As to everyone else, 
including Michael's creditors (and therefore Chesnoff), the 1988 and 1994 conveyances were 
valid. Indeed, "what might be considered a fraudulent conveyance is valid as to all the world 
except creditors of the grantor". Id- In attaching the Properties, Chesnoff is properly relying 
on the conveyances to Michael, just as Sabrina relied on Larry's conveyance to Jason. 
John also cites to Capital Assets Financial Services v. Lindsay, 956 P.2d 1090, 
1095 (Utah App.1998). In Capital Assets, Lott, the owner of real property, quit claimed 
certain property to Christensen, intending to convey enough interest for Christensen to secure 
financing with the property as collateral. Id. at 1096. Lott then intended for Christensen to 
transfer to Capital Assets the power to sell the land for an unpaid debt. Id. It was undisputed 
that neither party intended Christensen to have any "right, title, interest or claim" to the 
property. Id. at 1090. While Christensen held title to the property, a judgment lien against 
Christensen attached. Id- This Court held that Christensen's ownership interest in the 
property was sufficient to uphold the attachment, stating: 
It was not within the trial court's power to alter the judgment lien's 
quality on equitable grounds. As a matter of law, where an undisputed 
owner of fee simple title to real property conveys that real property to 
another by a standard form of quitclaim deed that contains no express 
reservation or exception to the title transferred, the grantee takes fee 
simple title. 
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Id. at 1096; see also Jacobson v. Jacobson, 557 P.2d 156, 158 (Utah 1976). 
In the instant case, John caused Michael to take title to the Properties by standard 
warranty deeds. There is no evidence that those deeds contained any express reservations 
or exceptions to the title transferred. Thus, it is assumed Michael took title in fee simple. 
Capital Assets, 956 P.2d at 1096. According to Capital Assets, this is clearly a sufficient 
interest in the real property for a creditor of Michael's, such as Chesnoff, to attach. Id. 
In Bill Nay & Sons Excavating v. Neeley Const., the court found that the defendant 
had fraudulently conveyed certain property to another entity to avoid a creditor. 677 P.2d 
1120, 1121 (Utah 1984). The court then held that a resulting trust had been established in 
the defendant's favor for the sole purpose of allowing the creditor, in equity, to attach to the 
transferred property. Id. at 1123. 
Again, Chesnoff does not dispute that the equitable remedy of a resulting trust was 
available to John's creditors when the Properties were titled in Michael's name. That is the 
holding in Neeley. However, Neeley does not stand for the proposition that John, after 
working a fraud on his creditors, can come in equity and claim the remedy of resulting trust 
to avoid Michael's creditors. 
The facts in Hergenreter v. Sommers are inapposite to the instant case. 535 S.W.2d 
513 (Mo. App. 1976). In Hergenreter, children had paid for property but their parents took 
title because of the children's status as minors. The parents' creditors attempted to attach to 
the property. The court found that a gift was not presumed when children, rather than a 
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parent, paid the consideration. In addition, the transferor, the Hergenreter children, had not 
attempted to avoid creditors and thus came to court with clean hands. 
III. THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY PRESUMED AN ADVERSE 
INFERENCE WITH RESPECT TO MICHAEL NIKOLS' REFUSAL TO 
TESTIFY. 
A. Evidence of Michael Nikols' drug trafficking would have been admissible 
in certain contexts. 
To say that evidence of drug trafficking is categorically inadmissible is contrary to 
Utah law. "Evidence of any fact which rationally tends to prove any material issue is 
admissible unless forbidden by some specific rule, and should be received if offered for an 
admissible purpose although it would be inadmissible if offered for some other purpose." 
State v. NeaL 254 P.2d 1053, 1056 (Utah 1953). 
Specifically, Utah Rule of Evidence 608(c) states "[b]ias, prejudice or any motive to 
misrepresent may be shown to impeach the witness either by examination of the witness or 
by evidence otherwise adduced." This rule gives "broad discretion to the trial court to allow 
or disallow inquiry concerning any witness's prior bad acts..." State v. Valdez. 141 P.3d 
614, 617 (Utah App. 2006). 
Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b) states: 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. 
It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of 
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 
absence of mistake or accident. 
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John frames this issue by stating "[Mr. Mercer] wanted to cross examine Michael 
about the pending trafficking charge in order to impeach his credibility." Brief of Appellant, 
pg. 23. John further argues that "nothing Mr. Chesnoff wanted to ask Michael Nikols would 
have been admissible." Id. at 22-23. Framing the issue in this light is far too limiting. Mr. 
Mercer did not necessarily intend to bring up Michael's crimes for impeachment purposes 
only. That line of questioning could have been used to show the parties' motive for 
transferring properties back and forth. It could have been used to establish the parties' true 
intentions concerning the transactions, as well as their knowledge that a resulting trust was 
not intended. It also could have been used to show bias, motive to lie or misrepresent, or to 
show a plan or scheme pursuant to URE 404(b) and 608(c), all of which can be proper uses 
of character evidence. Finally, Michael could have opened the door for Mr. Mercer by 
volunteering information regarding his drug trafficking, thus putting it at issue. 
John cites Crimm v. Missouri Pacific R. Co. for the proposition that "illegal drug use 
or transactions, without more, do not show untruthfulness" and thus may not be used to 
impeach. 750 F.2d 703 (8th Cir. 1984). However, the key phrase is "without more." In 
Crimm, the witness's only involvement with drugs was that he had used marijuana two or 
three years prior to trial. Id. Here, Michael's alleged actions are significantly more extensive 
than those in Crimm. Michael is accused of being the kingpin in a multi-person drug ring 
to distribute narcotics. R. 2953: 129; 155 (10-17). The drug ring was based out of 
Coachman's Restaurant, owned by John. Mr. Mercer's questioning about these actions, 
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including what properties were involved in the trafficking, could have revealed 
circumstances about the alleged resulting trust, thus making the evidence admissible. It is 
possible that John knew about the drug trafficking in his restaurant and that his titling of 
some property in his name and some in Michael's name was a scheme to protect both of their 
assets from the consequences of their illegal activity. 
Moreover, the credibility of the witnesses was a core component of this case. Michael 
is John's son, and they have been in business together for over 18 years. Their business 
interests are interconnected and thus Michael had a serious potential bias and motive to lie 
on his father's behalf. Without the opportunity to impeach Michael, Chesnoff s case would 
have been severely prejudiced. As the lower court stated: "I don't feel I can accept the 
testimony presented without making the witnesses available to be cross-examined. I think 
credibility is a very important issue here. There's serious issues - questions about 
credibility..." R.2953: 156(15-18). 
Neither party can accurately predict what testimony would have been elicited had 
Michael testified and been subject to cross-examination. Evidence "should be received if 
offered for an admissible purpose although it would be inadmissible if offered for some other 
purpose." Neal, 254 P.2d at 1056. John cannot hypothetically declare that information 
regarding Michael's drug trafficking would have been categorically inadmissible without 
knowing the context and purpose for which that evidence was to be elicited. 
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B. The lower court properly presumed an adverse inference against John 
Nikols with respect to Michael Nikols' refusal to testify. 
Courts have recognized the missing witness inference for over a century. See Graves 
v. United States. 150 U.S. 118,121 (1893). Essentially, the doctrine is that ifa party has the 
power to produce a witness whose testimony would elucidate a transaction but does not, his 
failure to produce the witness permits an inference that, had the testimony been produced, 
it would have been unfavorable. State v. Smith. 706 P.2d 1052, 1057 (Utah 1985); see also 
Wigmore, Evidence (3d Ed. 1940) § 285,162 ("The failure to bring before the tribunal some 
circumstance, document or witness ... serves to indicate, as the most natural inference, that 
the party fears to do so, and this fear is some evidence that the circumstance or document or 
witness, if brought, would have exposed facts unfavorable to that party.")- For purposes of 
this inference, a party has power to produce a witness if "the witness is physically available 
only to the opponent, or that the witness has the type of relationship with the opposing party 
that pragmatically renders his testimony unavailable to the opposing party." Smith, 706 P.2d 
at 1057-1058; see also State v. Thompson. 776 P.2d 48 (Utah 1989). 
The missing witness inference extends to civil cases and a witness's invocation of his 
Fifth Amendment right to silence. 
[T]he proposition is well established that in civil cases a party's failure 
to respond to valid inquiries on the basis of the privilege against self-
incrimination can give rise to an adverse inference against that party at 
trial. 
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First Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Salt Lake City v. Schamanek. 684 P.2d 1257,1267 (Utah 
1984). Indeed, "the Fifth Amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against parties to 
civil actions when they refuse to testify in response to probative evidence offered against 
them[.]" Baxter v. Palmigiano. 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976). 
In this case, Michael has been an employee of Coachman's Restaurant since he was 
14 years old. R. 2953: 87 (17-20). At one point, Michael was president of the restaurant and 
actively ran the business for his father. R. 2953: 49. Michael and John were also, at one 
point, represented by the same legal counsel. R. 147: (10-12). Michael was clearly a witness 
that was "peculiarly" within John's power to produce because they enjoy "the type of 
relationship...that pragmatically renders [Michael's] testimony unavailable" to Chesnoff. 
Smith, 706 P.2d at 105 8. Furthermore, Michael's status as long time employee of 
Coachman's makes his refusal to testify (without waiving his Fifth Amendment rights) 
attributable to John, his employer. Rad Services, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety 
Company, 808 F.2d 271,275 (3rd Cir. 1986); see also Brink's Inc. v. City of New York, 171 
F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1983). 
Therefore, the lower court's inference that Michael's testimony would have been 
adverse to John was appropriate under the circumstances. 
IV. THE COURT CORRECTLY IMPOSED AN ADVERSE INFERENCE 
AGAINST JOHN NIKOLS WITH RESPECT TO MIKE NIKOLS' REFUSAL 
TO WAIVE THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE. 
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In his brief, John incorrectly states that "John Nikols established his case before 
submitting it to Mr. Chesnoff s witnesses, at which point Mr. Chesnoff chose not to testify." 
App. Brief 34. In reality, Chesnoff was prohibited from effectively presenting his case by 
John and Michael's refusal to waive the attorney-client privilege. 
At trial, counsel for Chesnoff stated: 
It's Mr. Chesnoff who informed me at the break that he is concerned 
about Mr. Nikols and what he is about to say. And this is his idea. 
He's willing to testify. I know what his testimony is going to be,... and 
I think it causes Mr. Michael Nikols some problems. 
R. 2953: 125 (1-5) (emphasis added). Chesnoff was clearly ready and willing to testify at 
trial. At that point, the lower court asked Michael if he was willing to waive the attorney-
client privilege created while Michael was represented by Chesnoff. R. 2953:156-157 (1 -6). 
Michael refused. John's counsel also made it clear that she did not want Michael to waive 
his attorney-client privilege as to Chesnoff s testimony. R. 2953: 156 (24-25); 157 (1-6). 
As a result, Chesnoff was effectively prevented from putting on his case, because he was 
unable to testify about Michael and John and about any improper purpose regarding the 
Properties. 
The missing witness inference, discussed supra, also applies to John's failure to allow 
Chesnoff to testify as to what he knew. Chesnoff was present at the hearing and more than 
willing to testify as to discussions he had with Michael and John regarding the Properties. 
Chesnoff s testimony would have been probative of whether there was a purchase money 
resulting trust. However, Michael refiised to waive the attorney-client privilege, both on his 
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own and via John's legal counsel. The attorney-client privilege could not have been waived 
unilaterally by Chesnoff. 
John, the suppressing party, had control of Chesnoff s testimony in the sense that 
Michael is John's son and business partner and their interests in the outcome of the case were 
interconnected. Michael (and John's counsel) refused to waive Michael's attorney-client 
privilege, thus preventing Chesnoff from putting on his evidence. For these reasons, the 
lower court properly inferred that Chesnoff s testimony would have been adverse to John's 
case. 
John cites Roth v. New Hotel Monteleone for the proposition that the adverse 
inference is not intended to penalize parties who do not have the power to produce witnesses 
to testify. 978 So.2d 1008 (La. Ct. App. 2008). However, Roth is readily distinguishable. 
In that case, the court held that the missing witness inference did not apply where "evidence 
in the record indicates that there were witnesses who were no longer in the [suppressing 
party's] employ and were dispersed by Hurricane Katrina..." Id- at 1012. In this case, 
Chesnoff was in the courtroom and ready to take the stand. 
V. CHESNOFF COULD NOT HAVE ESTABLISHED HIS CLAIMS AGAINST 
JOHN NIKOLS WITHOUT DISCLOSING PRIVILEGED 
COMMUNICATIONS WITH MICHAEL NIKOLS. 
At trial, John sought to limit Chesnoff s testimony exclusively to issues dealing with 
the Properties. R. 2953:125 (6-18). However, it is fundamental that "either party is entitled 
to introduce testimony to rebut evidence introduced by his adversary." Panhandle 
Construction Co. v. City of Spearman, 89 S.W.2d 1053,1055 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954). Indeed, 
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a basic principle of justice is that "a party seeking adjudication of his rights should be neither 
prevented nor dissuaded from presenting any evidence he desires which is competent and 
material to the issues." Cooper v. Industrial Commission, 387 P.2d 689, 690 (Utah 1963). 
The lower court was clearly concerned about John's request to limit Chesnoff s 
testimony. Judge Kennedy stated: 
I can conceive of a number of different scenarios during the course of 
a conversation with a client where different subjects are discussed and 
one thing leads to another... and discussing different matters during the 
course of that, where - where the money might come from, where he 
wouldn't want it to come from, etcetera, etcetera...I can't say that... 
they only were going to talk about four properties and that's all. 
R. 2953: 125-126. The lower court also pointed out that John was "picking and choosing 
what [Chesnoff] can testify to... . But he may say' Well, the first thing I said to John was, 
well, John, I don't want to receive any drug money here' and there was an ensuing discussion 
regarding the receipt of drug money." R. 2953: 135. 
The lower court further reasoned as follows: 
I don't feel I can accept the testimony presented without making the 
witnesses available to be cross-examined. I think credibility is a very 
important issue here. There's serious issues - questions about 
credibility and - and we're trying to go back 18 years and have the 
Court believe that this is what was done and this is the reason it was 
done, and you should accept our version, the Nikols version, without 
being able to cross-examine it or call the opposing witnesses.. .I've got 
to hear the whole - the whole ball of wax or none of it. 
R. 2953: 156; 144 (2-14); 145 (2-3) (emphasis added). The lower court then 
concluded: "If [counsel for John] is willing to let Mr. Chesnoff testify, I'll be happy to - to 
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have him testify and hear and waive it. Absent letting him testify, I am going to 
presume.. .that the evidence would go against [John]." R. 2953: 157 (1-6). 
As the lower court noted, a key issue in the federal seizure proceeding was whether 
drug money was used to acquire the Properties. R.2953: 139-140.. As counsel for John and 
Michael on this issue, Chesnoff had direct communications with them about how the 
Properties were purchased. That evidence would have been directly relevant to John's 
resulting trust claim. Furthermore, Chesnoff had discussions with John and Michael about 
the payment of his legal retainer, which included discussions about who owned the 
Properties. Because John and Michael were unwilling to waive the attorney-client privilege, 
Chesnoff was unfairly limited in his testimony and therefore could not have put on his entire 
case. 
The lower court correctly ruled that if Chesnoff testified, all relevant issues would be 
open for questioning and he should not be limited by the attorney client privilege. However, 
John refused to allow Chesnoff to testify under those terms. Thus, while Chesnoff was ready 
and willing to testify as to the conversations he had with John and Michael regarding the 
Properties, he was prohibited from doing so by John. On that basis, the lower court correctly 
inferred that Chesnoff s testimony would have been adverse to John's resulting trust claim. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, evidence, and case law, Appellees respectfully 
request that the Court affirm the lower court's findings of fact and conclusions of law and 
affirm that court's ruling to allow Appellees to proceed with their writ of attachment. 
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Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 404 
c 
WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
STATE COURT RULES 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
ARTICLE IV. RELEVANCY AND ITS LIMITS 
-+RULE 404. CHARACTER EVIDENCE NOT ADMISSIBLE TO PROVE CONDUCT; EXCEPTIONS; 
OTHER CRIMES 
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of 
character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity there-
with on a particular occasion, except: 
(a)(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered 
by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or if evidence of a trait 
of character of the alleged victim of the crime is offered by the accused and ad-
mitted under Rule 404(a)(2), evidence of the same trait of character of the ac-
cused offered by the prosecution; 
(a)(2) Character of alleged victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of 
the alleged victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to 
rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the alleged 
victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the 
alleged victim was the first aggressor; 
(a)(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided 
in Rules 607, 608, and 609. 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is 
not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in con-
formity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as 
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 
absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the 
prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of tri-
al, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of 
the nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial. 
(c) Evidence of similar crimes in child molestation cases. 
(c)(1) In a criminal case in which the accused is charged with child molestation, 
evidence of the commission of other acts of child molestation may be admissible to 
prove a propensity to commit the crime charged provided that the prosecution in a 
criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial 
if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the nature of any 
such evidence it intends to introduce at trial. 
2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
http://web2.westlaw.com/prin^ 10/28/2008 
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Page 2 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 404 
(c)(2) For purposes of this rule "child molestation" means an act committed in re-
lation to a child under the age of 14 which would, if committed in this state, be 
a sexual offense or an attempt to commit a sexual offense. 
(c)(3) Rule 404(c) does not limit the admissibility of evidence otherwise admiss-
ible under Rule 404(a), 404(b), or any other rule of evidence. 
Current with amendments effective April 1, 2008 
Copr ® 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt, works. 
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Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 608 
c 
WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
STATE COURT RULES 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
ARTICLE VI. WITNESSES 
_>RULE 608. EVIDENCE OF CHARACTER AND CONDUCT OF WITNESS 
(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character. The credibility of a witness 
may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but 
subject to these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to character for 
truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful character is admiss-
ible only after the character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by 
opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise. 
(b) Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of the conduct of a wit-
ness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness1 character for truth-
fulness, other than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved 
by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if 
probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination 
of the witness (1) concerning the witness' character for truthfulness or untruth-
fulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of an-
other witness as to which character the witness being cross-examined has testi-
fied. 
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any other witness, does not 
operate as a waiver of the accused's or the witness' privilege against self-
incrimination when examined with respect to matters that relate only to character 
for truthfulness. 
(c) Evidence of bias. Bias, prejudice or any motive to misrepresent may be shown 
to impeach the witness either by examination of the witness or by evidence other-
wise adduced. 
Current with amendments effective April 1, 2008 
Copr ® 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt, works. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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Rules App.Proc, Rule 24 
c 
WEST'S UTAH COURT RULES ANNOTATED 
STATE COURT RULES 
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
TITLE V. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
^RULE 24. BRIEFS 
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under ap-
propriate headings and in the order indicated: 
(a)(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency 
whose judgment or order is sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of the 
case on appeal contains the names of all such parties. The list should be set out 
on a separate page which appears immediately inside the cover. 
(a)(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page ref-
erences . 
(a)(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with parallel 
citations, rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with references to the 
pages of the brief where they are cited. 
(a)(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court. 
(a)(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue: 
the standard of appellate review with supporting authority; and 
(a)(5)(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial 
court; or 
(a)(5)(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in 
the trial court. 
(a)(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations 
whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to 
the appeal shall be set out verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the per-
tinent part of the provision is lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, and the 
provision shall be set forth in an addendum to the brief under paragraph (11) of 
this rule. 
(a) (7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the 
nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court 
below. A statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for review shall 
follow. All statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be 
supported by citations to the record in accordance with paragraph (e) of this 
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r u l e . 
(a)(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably paragraphed, 
shall be a succinct condensation of the arguments actually made in the body of the 
brief. It shall not be a mere repetition of the heading under which the argument 
is arranged. 
(a)(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the 
appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for review-
ing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, 
statutes, and parts of the record relied on. A party challenging a fact finding 
must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding. A 
party seeking to recover attorney's fees incurred on appeal shall state the re-
quest explicitly and set forth the legal basis for such an award. 
(a)(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought. 
(a)(11) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is necessary un-
der this paragraph. The addendum shall be bound as part of the brief unless doing 
so makes the brief unreasonably thick. If the addendum is bound separately, the 
addendum shall contain a table of contents. The addendum shall contain a copy of: 
(a)(11)(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central 
importance cited in the brief but not reproduced verbatim in the brief; 
(a)(11)(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of Appeals 
opinion; in all cases any court opinion of central importance to the appeal but 
not available to the court as part of a regularly published reporter service; and 
(a) (11) (C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to 
the determination of the appeal, such as the challenged instructions, findings of 
fact and conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the transcript of the court's 
oral decision, or the contract or document subject to construction. 
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the require-
ments of paragraph (a) of this rule, except that the appellee need not include: 
(b)(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is dissatis-
fied with the statement of the appellant; or 
(b) (2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the addendum of the 
appellant. The appellee may refer to the addendum of the appellant. 
(c) Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the ap-
pellee, and if the appellee has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief in 
reply to the response of the appellant to the issues presented by the cross-ap-
peal. Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in the 
opposing brief. The content of the reply brief shall conform to the requirements 
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of paragraphs (a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of this rule. No further briefs may be 
filed except with leave of the appellate court. 
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their briefs and 
oral arguments to keep to a minimum references to parties by such designations as 
"appellant" and "appellee." It promotes clarity to use the designations used in 
the lower court or in the agency proceedings, or the actual names of parties, or 
descriptive terms such as "the employee," "the injured person,• "the taxpayer," 
etc. 
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the pages of 
the original record as paginated pursuant to Rule 11(b) or to pages of any state-
ment of the evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared pursuant to Rule 
11(f) or 11(g). References to pages of published depositions or transcripts shall 
identify the sequential number of the cover page of each volume as marked by the 
clerk on the bottom right corner and each separately numbered page(s) referred to 
within the deposition or transcript as marked by the transcriber. References to 
exhibits shall be made to the exhibit numbers. If reference is made to evidence 
the admissibility of which is in controversy, reference shall be made to the pages 
of the record at which the evidence was identified, offered, and received or re-
jected. 
(f) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs shall 
not exceed 50 pages, and reply briefs shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of 
pages containing the table of contents, tables of citations and any addendum con-
taining statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the record as irequired by 
paragraph (a) of this rule. In cases involving cross-appeals, paragraph (g) of 
this rule sets forth the length of briefs. 
(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed, the 
party first filing a notice of appeal shall be deemed the appellant, unless the 
parties otherwise agree or the court otherwise orders. Each party shall be en-
titled to file two briefs. No brief shall exceed 50 pages, and no party's briefs 
shall in combination exceed 75 pages. 
(g)(1) The appellant shall file a Brief of Appellant, which shall present the is-
sues raised in the appeal. 
(g)(2) The appellee shall then file one brief, entitled Brief of Appellee and 
Cross-Appellant, which shall respond to the issues raised in the Brief of Appel-
lant and present the issues raised in the cross-appeal. 
(g)(3) The appellant shall then file one brief, entitled Reply Brief of Appellant 
and Brief of Cross-Appellee, which shall reply to the Brief of Appellee and re-
spond to the Brief of Cross-Appellant. 
(g)(4) The appellee may then file a Reply Brief of Cross-Appellant, which shall 
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reply to the Brief of Cross-Appellee. 
(h) Permission for over length brief. While such motions are disfavored, the 
court for good cause shown may upon motion permit a party to file a brief that ex-
ceeds the limitations of this rule. The motion shall state with specificity the 
issues to be briefed, the number of additional pages requested, and the good cause 
for granting the motion. A motion filed at least seven days before the date the 
brief is due or seeking five or fewer additional pages need not be accompanied by 
a copy of the brief. A motion filed less than seven days before the date the 
brief is due and seeking more than 5 additional pages shall be accompanied by a 
copy of the draft brief for in camera inspection. If the motion is granted, any 
responding party is entitled to an equal number of additional pages without fur-
ther order of the court. Whether the motion is granted or denied, the draft brief 
will be destroyed by the court. 
(i) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases in-
volving more than one appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated for pur-
poses of the appeal, any number of either may join in a single brief, and any ap-
pellant or appellee may adopt by reference any part of the brief of another. 
Parties may similarly join in reply briefs. 
(j) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant author-
ities come to the attention of a party after that party's brief has been filed, or 
after oral argument but before decision, a party may promptly advise the clerk of 
the appellate court, by letter setting forth the citations. An original letter 
and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An original letter and seven 
copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a reference either 
to the page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the citations per-
tain, but the letter shall state the reasons for the supplemental citations. The 
body of the letter must not exceed 350 words. Any response shall be made within 7 
days of filing and shall be similarly limited. 
(k) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise, 
presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and free from 
burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which are not in 
compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court, 
and the court may assess attorney fees against the offending lawyer. 
Current with amendments effective April 1, 2 0 08 
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c 
Restatement of the Law — Trusts 
Restatement (Second) of Trusts 
Current through August 2008 
Copyright © 1959-2008 by the American Law Institute 
Chapter 12. Resulting Trusts 
Topic 4. Where Property Is Transferred To One Person And The Purchase Price Is Paid By Another 
§ 442. Purchase In The Name Of A Relative 
Link to Case Citations 
Where a transfer of property is made to one person and the purchase price is paid by another and the 
transferee is a wife, child or other natural object of bounty of the person by whom the purchase price is 
paid, a resulting trust does not arise unless the latter manifests an intention that the transferee should not 
have the beneficial interest in the property. 
See Reporter's Note. 
Comment: 
a. To what relatives rule is applicable. The application of the rule stated in this Section is not determined by 
the closeness of the relationship or the extent of natural affection between the payor and transferee. It is rather a 
question of whether the transferee stands in such a relationship to the payor that it is probable that the payor in-
tends to make a gift to the transferee. It is inferred that he does intend to make a gift if the transferee is by virtue 
of the relationship a natural object of his bounty. 
The rule stated in this Section is applicable where the payor and transferee respectively are in the relation of 
husband and wife; father and child; mother and child; father-in-law and son-in-law; grandparent and grandchild. 
It applies to the relation of parent and child although the child is an illegitimate or an adopted child. It is imma-
terial that the child is an adult. It applies also where the payor stands in loco parentis to the transferee; that is, 
where the payor whether or not related to the transferee has assumed to act in the place of a parent of the trans-
feree. 
It does not apply where the payor and transferee respectively are wife and husband, or child and parent. It 
does not apply where the payor does not stand in loco parentis to the transferee merely because the payor and 
transferee respectively are brothers and sisters, uncle or aunt and nephew or niece. 
It applies where the payor is a man and is engaged to be married to the transferee, but not where the transferee 
is already married to another person. It does not apply to unmarried persons unlawfully cohabiting. 
b. Effect of the rule. The fact that the transferee is a wife, child or other natural object of bounty of the payor 
is more than merely a circumstance tending to rebut the inference of a resulting trust. It is of itself a circum-
stance sufficient to raise an inference that a gift was intended, and the burden is upon the payor seeking to en-
force a resulting trust to prove that he did not intend to make a gift to the transferee. See § 443. If the transferee 
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is related to the payor, but is not in such a relation as to be a natural object of bounty of the payor, this circum-
stance is not enough to raise an inference that a gift was intended, but it is a circumstance which can be shown 
with other circumstances as tending to rebut the inference that a resulting trust arises. See § 441, Comment b. 
Case Citations 
Reporter's Notes & Cross References through December 1958 
— June 1986Case Citations January 1959 — June 1986 
— June 2007Case Citations July 1986 — June 2007 
— April 2008Case Citations July 2007 — April 2008 
Reporter's Notes & Cross References through December 1958: 
REPORTER'S NOTES 
In the absence of evidence of a contrary intention, a resulting trust does not arise where the grantee is a natural 
object of bounty of the payor. See the following cases which cite the Restatement of Trusts, § 442. Blaine v. 
Blaine, 63 Ariz. 100, 159 P.2d 786 (1945); Altramano v. Swan, 20 Cal.2d 622, 128 P.2d 353 (1942); State v. 
One Buick Sedan Automobile, 216 Minn. 129, 12 N.W.2d 1 (1943); Mott v. Iossa, 119 N.J.Eq. 185, 181 A. 689 
(1935); Dahl v. Simonsen, 157 Or. 238, 70 P.2d 49 (1937); Citizens Deposit & Trust Co. of Sharpsburg v. Cit-
izens Deposit & Trust Co. of Sharpsburg, 136 Pa.Super. 413, 7 A.2d 519 (1939); Dunning v. Dunning, 30 
Del.Co.Rep. 361 (Pa.1941); Caulk v. Caulk, 211 S.C. 57, 43 S.E.2d 600 (1947); Norman v. Kernan, 226 Wis. 
78, 276 N.W. 127 (1937); Hanus v. Jankowski, 256 Wis. 187, 40 N.W.2d 573 (1949). 
In general as to the effect of the purchase of property in the name of a relative, see 4 Scott on Trusts (2d 
ed.1956) § 442; Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, §§ 459, 460. 
Cross References to 
1. Digest System Key Numbers 
Descent and Distribution &zz> 115 
Trusts €=> 81(1-4) 
2. A.L.R. Annotation 
Presumption as to advancement or trust where property is purchased with money of parent and title taken in 
name of child. 26 A.L.R. 1126, s. 31 A.L.R.2d 1036. 
Marital misconduct as raising trust in property paid for by one spouse but conveyed to the other. 29 A.L.R. 218. 
Resulting trust in respect of property accumulated by a man and woman living together in illicit relations or 
under void marriage. 31 A.L.R.2d 1255. 
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Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 443 (1959) 
c 
Restatement of the Law — Trusts 
Restatement (Second) of Trusts 
Current through August 2008 
Copyright © 1959-2008 by the American Law Institute 
Chapter 12. Resulting Trusts 
Topic 4. Where Property Is Transferred To One Person And The Purchase Price Is Paid By Another 
§ 443. Rebutting The Presumption Of A Gift To A Relative 
Link to Case Citations 
Where a transfer of property is made to one person and the purchase price is paid by another, and the 
transferee is a wife, child or other natural object of bounty of the person by whom the purchase price is 
paid, and the latter manifests an intention that the transferee should not have the beneficial interest in the 
property, a resulting trust arises. 
See Reporter's Note. 
Comment: 
a. Admissibility of parol evidence to rebut the inference of a gift Where one person pays the purchase price 
for property which is transferred at his direction to another who is a natural object of his bounty, parol evidence 
is admissible to show that the payor intended that the transferee should not have the beneficial interest in the 
property, even though the property transferred was an interest in land and the Statute of Frauds is in force. The 
intention of the payor not to make a gift to the transferee may be shown not only by oral declarations of his in-
tention, but also by the circumstances under which the transfer is made. Thus, the fact that it would be improvid-
ent for the payor to make a gift to the transferee is an indication that he did not intend to make a gift. So also, 
the fact that the circumstances are such that the payor would have a reason for taking title in the name of another 
other than an intention to give him the beneficial interest is an indication that he did not intend to make a gift; 
as, for example, where the payor had reasons for wishing that it should not be known that he was purchasing the 
property. 
It is the intention of the payor at the time of the transfer and not at some subsequent time which determines 
whether a resulting trust arises. Compare § 457. The conduct of the payor and of the transferee subsequent to the 
transfer, however, may be such as to show that at the time of the transfer the payor did not intend to make a gift 
to the transferee. Thus, the fact that the payor manages the property, collects rents, pays taxes and insurance, 
pays for repairs and improvements, or otherwise asserts ownership, and the acquiescence by the transferee in 
such assertion of ownership, is evidence to rebut the inference of an intention by the payor to make a gift to the 
transferee. 
b. Rebutting in part the inference of a gift. Where one person pays the purchase price for property which is 
transferred at his direction to another who is a natural object of his bounty, and it is shown that the payor inten-
ded to have a partial interest in the property, a resulting trust arises in favor of the payor as to such interest but 
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only as to such interest. Compare § 441, Comment/ 
a Resulting trust on condition precedent or subsequent. Where one person pays the purchase price for prop-
erty which is transferred at his direction to another who is a natural object of his bounty, and it is shown that the 
payor intended to have the beneficial interest only upon the happening of a designated event, a resulting trust 
arises in his favor upon the happening of the event, but only upon the happening of the event. Compare § 441, 
Comment g. So also, if it is shown that the payor intended that he should have the beneficial interest but that his 
interest should terminate upon the happening of a designated event, the transferee upon the happening of the 
event can hold the property free of trust. Compare § 441, Comment h. 
d. Where the payor manifests an intention to create an express trust for a third person. Where one person pays 
the purchase price for property which is transferred at his direction to another who is a natural object of his 
bounty, and the payor properly manifests an intention to create an express trust for a third person, neither can the 
transferee keep the property nor will a resulting trust arise in favor of the payor, but there is an express trust for 
the third person. Compare § 441, Comment k. If the intention of the payor to create an express trust for a third 
person is not properly manifested and the transferee refuses to perform the trust or to bind himself to perform it, 
a constructive trust arises in favor of the payor. Compare § 441, Comment /. 
Case Citations 
Reporter's Notes & Cross References through December 1958 
— June 1986Case Citations January 1959 — June 1986 
— June 2007Case Citations July 1986 — June 2007 
— April 2008Case Citations July 2007 — April 2008 
Reporter's Notes & Cross References through December 1958: 
REPORTER'S NOTES 
Even though the grantee is a natural object of bounty of the payor, a resulting trust arises if it appears that the 
payor of the purchase price did not intend to make a gift to the grantee. See the following cases citing the Re-
statement of Trusts, § 443. Nolan v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 326 Ill.App. 328, 61 N.E.2d 876 
(1945); Rebel v. Lunsford, 216 S.W.2d 68 (Mo.1949); Warford v. Smoot, 361 Mo. 879, 237 S.W.2d 184 (1951). 
Cross References to 
Digest System Key Numbers 
Trusts € ^ > 81(1), 89(1) 
— June 1986:Case Citations January 1959 — June 1986: 
C.A.3, 1963. Cit. in ftn. in sup. Where wife paid purchase price and property was transferred to the hus-
band, a resulting trust arose in favor of the wife where no contrary intention was manifested. Wallace v. Kil-
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Current through August 2008 
Copyright © 1959-2008 by the American Law Institute 
Chapter 12. Resulting Trusts 
Topic 4. Where Property Is Transferred To One Person And The Purchase Price Is Paid By Another 
§ 444. Illegal Purpose 
Link to Case Citations 
Where a transfer of property is made to one person and another pays the purchase price in order to ac-
complish an illegal purpose, a resulting trust does not arise if the policy against unjust enrichment of the 
transferee is outweighed by the policy against giving relief to a person who has entered into an illegal 
transaction. 
See Reporter's Note. 
Comment: 
a. The rule stated in this Section is based upon the same policy as that upon which § 422 is based. Whether the 
owner of property transfers it upon a trust which fails for illegality (see § 422), or whether property is purchased 
and title is taken in the name of another to accomplish an illegal purpose, a resulting trust arises unless the cir-
cumstances are such that it is against public policy to enforce such a resulting trust. 
As to the circumstances under which an intended trust fails for illegality, see §§ 60-65. 
b. Fraud on creditors. The most common situation in which the principle stated in this Section is applied is 
that in which the purchaser of property takes title in the name of another for the purpose of defrauding his credit-
ors. See §§ 63, 422. 
c. In several States it is provided by statute that when a conveyance of land is made to one person and the con-
sideration is paid by another, no trust shall result to the latter (see § 440, Comment i), and that such a convey-
ance shall be presumed fraudulent as against creditors of the person paying the consideration, and that a trust 
shall result in favor of such creditors to the extent necessary to pay their just demands, unless a fraudulent intent 
is disproved. 
The property is, in fact, subject to a constructive trust, rather than a resulting trust, for the creditors. 
d. Defrauding the government. If a person who is not entitled to acquire government land pays the purchase 
price for such land and takes title to the land in the name of another for the purpose of defrauding the govern-
ment, he cannot enforce a resulting trust in his favor, even though the government does not take any steps to set 
aside the transaction for fraud. 
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e. Savings bank trusts. If a person deposits money in a savings account in a bank in the name of another per-
son, and it appears that the depositor already had on deposit the maximum amount permitted to a single deposit-
or by statute or by the by-laws of the bank, and the deposit was made in the name of another for the purpose of 
evading the statute or by-law, the person in whose name the deposit was made holds his claim against the bank 
upon a resulting trust for the depositor. The purpose of the depositor is not so seriously against public policy as 
to prevent him from enforcing the resulting trust. 
/ Aliens. By statute in a few States land acquired by aliens or certain classes of aliens is subject to forfeiture 
to the State. In such States the equitable interest of an alien beneficiary of a trust of land is likewise subject to 
forfeiture. See § 117, Comment b. In such States if an alien pays the purchase price for land and at his direction 
the land is transferred to another under such circumstances that a resulting trust would arise if the payor were 
not an alien, a resulting trust arises in favor of the alien, and his interest is subject to forfeiture to the State. 
Case Citations 
Reporter's Notes & Cross References through December 1958 
— June 1986Case Citations January 1959 — June 1986 
— June 2007Case Citations July 1986 — June 2007 
— April 2008Case Citations July 2007 — April 2008 
Reporter's Notes & Cross References through December 1958: 
REPORTER'S NOTES 
Where a person purchases property in the name of another for the purpose of defrauding the purchaser's cred-
itors, it is generally held that he is precluded from enforcing a resulting trust. Harrell v. Fiveash, 182 Ga. 362, 
185 S.E. 327 (1936); Stamper v. Stamper, 227 Ind. 15, 83 N.E.2d 184 (1949) (semble); Ford's Ex'rs v. Lewis, 10 
B.Mon. (Ky.) 127 (1849); Pollock v. Pollock, 223 Mass. 382, 111 N.E. 963 (1916); Sell v. West, 125 Mo. 621, 
28 S.W. 969 (1894); Keener v. Williams, 307 Mo. 682, 271 S.W. 489 (1925); Baldwin v. Campfield, 4 Halst. 
(N.J.) 600, 891 (1853); Sayre v. Lemberger, 92 N.J.Eq. 656, 114 A. 454 (1921); Culley v. Carr, 137 N.J.Eq. 516, 
45 A.2d 850 (1946); Pope v. Bain, 8 N.J.Super. 263, 74 A.2d 317 (1950), reversed on other grounds 6 N.J. 351, 
78 A.2d 820 (1951); Proseus v. Mclntyre, 5 Barb. (N.Y.) 424 (1849); McClintock v. Loisseau, 31 W.Va. 865, 8 
S.E. 612 (1888); Gascoigne v. Gascoigne, [1918] 1 K.B. 223. 
Cross References to 
1. Digest System Key Numbers 
Fraudulent Conveyances € ^ > 174(3) 
Trusts € ^ > 80 
2. A.L.R. Annotation 
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